Kant`s Theory of Freedom

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublication details: New York Cambridge University Press 0000Description: 304pDDC classification:
  • N75.1KI AL561
Partial contents:
Part I: Freedom and rational agency in the Critique of Pure Reason 1 The Third Antinomy 11 I: Some preliminaries 11 II: The arguments 14 III: The resolution of the Third Antinomy 22 IV: The Third Antinomy and freedom of the will 25 2 Empirical and intelligible character 29 I: The distinction in general and empirical character in particular 30 II: Intelligible character 35 III: The compatibility of empirical and intelligible character 41 IV: Timeless agency and the causality of reason 47 3 Practical and transcendental freedom 54 I: Freedom in the Dialectic and the Canon 54 II: The ambiguous nature of practical freedom 59 n III: Freedom in Kant`s moral theory circa 1781 66 4 Two alternative interpretations 71 I: Beck`s critique and reconstruction 71 II: Transcendental idealism and anomalous monism 76 Part II: Moral agency and moral psychology 5 Rational agency and autonomy I: Rational agency in Groundwork 11 f II: Autonomy as a property of the will III: From property to principle 6 Duty, inclination, and respect II: Respect ¿ I: A good will and moral worth 7 Wille, Willkiir, and Gesinnung I: The Wille-Willkur distinction II: Kant`s concept of Gesinnung 8 Radical evil I: Radical evil and rigorism II: The propensity and its universality III: Degrees of radical evil 9 Virtue and holiness I: The nature of virtue II: Holiness as a moral ideal 10 The classical objections I: Schiller`s critique II: Hegel`s critique III: Williams`s critique Part III: The justification of morality and freedom 11 The Reciprocity Thesis I: The formulations of the thesis II: Freedom and practical law: a first attempt III: Freedom and practical law: completing the argument IV: From practical law to the moral law 12 The deduction in Groundwork III I: The preparatory argument II: The hidden circle III: Completing the deduction IV: The failure of the deduction 13 The fact of reason and the deduction of freedom I: The nature of the fact II: The fact as the fact of reason III: The deduction of freedom: the basic argument IV: The deduction of freedom, the Third Antinomy, and the unity of theoretical and practical reason V: The deduction of freedom: a final consideration
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Part I: Freedom and rational agency in the Critique of Pure Reason 1 The Third Antinomy 11 I: Some preliminaries 11 II: The arguments 14 III: The resolution of the Third Antinomy 22 IV: The Third Antinomy and freedom of the will 25 2 Empirical and intelligible character 29 I: The distinction in general and empirical character in particular 30 II: Intelligible character 35 III: The compatibility of empirical and intelligible character 41 IV: Timeless agency and the causality of reason 47 3 Practical and transcendental freedom 54 I: Freedom in the Dialectic and the Canon 54 II: The ambiguous nature of practical freedom 59 n III: Freedom in Kant`s moral theory circa 1781 66 4 Two alternative interpretations 71 I: Beck`s critique and reconstruction 71 II: Transcendental idealism and anomalous monism 76 Part II: Moral agency and moral psychology 5 Rational agency and autonomy I: Rational agency in Groundwork 11 f II: Autonomy as a property of the will III: From property to principle 6 Duty, inclination, and respect II: Respect ¿ I: A good will and moral worth 7 Wille, Willkiir, and Gesinnung I: The Wille-Willkur distinction II: Kant`s concept of Gesinnung 8 Radical evil I: Radical evil and rigorism II: The propensity and its universality III: Degrees of radical evil 9 Virtue and holiness I: The nature of virtue II: Holiness as a moral ideal 10 The classical objections I: Schiller`s critique II: Hegel`s critique III: Williams`s critique Part III: The justification of morality and freedom 11 The Reciprocity Thesis I: The formulations of the thesis II: Freedom and practical law: a first attempt III: Freedom and practical law: completing the argument IV: From practical law to the moral law 12 The deduction in Groundwork III I: The preparatory argument II: The hidden circle III: Completing the deduction IV: The failure of the deduction 13 The fact of reason and the deduction of freedom I: The nature of the fact II: The fact as the fact of reason III: The deduction of freedom: the basic argument IV: The deduction of freedom, the Third Antinomy, and the unity of theoretical and practical reason V: The deduction of freedom: a final consideration

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