On Human Rights James Griffin.

includes index and biblioraphy

PART I: AN ACCOUNT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
1. Human Rights: The Incomplete Idea 9
1.1 The Enlightenment project on human rights 9
1.2 The indeterminateness of the term`human right` 14
1.3 Remedies for the indeterminateness 18
1.4 Different approaches to explaining rights: substantive and structural accounts
1.5 A different kind of substantive account 22
1.6 How should we go about completing the idea? 27
2. First Steps in an Account of Human Rights 29
2.1 Top-down and bottom-up accounts 29
2.2 The human rights tradition 30
2.3 A proposal of a substantive account 32
2.4 One ground for human rights: personhood 33
2.5 A second ground: practicalities 37
2.6 Is there a third ground?: equality 39
2.7 How we should understand `agency`? 44
2.8 In what sense are human rights `universal`? 48
2.9 Do we need a more pluralist account? 51
3. When Human Rights Conflict 57
3.1 One of the central questions of ethics 57
3.2 Conflicts between human rights themselves 58
3.3 Are human rights co-possible? 60
3.4 Conflicts between a human right and other kinds of moral consideration 63
3.5 A proposal and a qualification 66
3.6 A step beyond intuition 76
3.7 Some ways in which human rights resist trade-offs 79
3.8 Reprise 81
4. Whose Rights? 83
4.1 The scope of the question 83
4.2 Potential agents 83
4.3 The inference from moral weight to human rights 86
4.4 Need accounts of human rights 88
4.5 A class of rights on their own? 90
4.6 A role for stipulation 91
4.7 Coming into rights in stages 94
5. My Rights: But Whose Duties? 96
5.1 Introduction 96
5.2 What duties? 97
5.3 Whose duties? 101
5.4 Primary and secondary duties 104
5.5 AIDS in Africa 105
5.6 Can there be rights without indentifiable duty-bearers? 107
6. The Metaphysics of Human Rights 111
6.1 Two models of value judgement 111
6.2 Human interests and the natural world 116
6.3 The test of the best explanation 121
6.4 The metaphysics of human rights 124
7. The Relativity and Ethnocentricity of Human Rights 129
7.1 Ethical relativity 129
7.2 The relativity of human rights 133
7.3 What is the problem of ethnocentricity? 137
7.4 Tolerance 142
Contents PART II: HIGHEST-LEVEL HUMAN RIGHTS
8. Autonomy 149
8.1 The three highest-level human rights 149
8.2 The distinction between autonomy and liberty 149
8.3 The value of autonomy 151
8.4 The content of the right to autonomy 152
8.5 Autonomy and free will: what if we are not autonomous? 157
9. Liberty 159
9.1 Highest-level rights 159
9.2 Broad and narrow interpretations of liberty 159
9.3 `Pursuit` 160
9.4 Negative and positive sides of liberty 166
9.5 How demanding is the right? 167
9.6 Mill`s `one very simple principle` of liberty 169
9.7 Generalizing the results 174
10. Welfare 176
10.1 The historical growth of rights 176
10.2 Welfare: a civil, not a human, right? 177
10.3 A case for a human right to welfare 179
10.4 Is the proposed right too demanding? 182
10.5 The undeserving poor 184
10.6 Human rights, legal rights, and rights in the United Nations 186
PART III: APPLICATIONS
11. Human Rights: Discrepancies Between Philosophy and International Law 191
11.1 Applications of the personhood account 191
11.2 Bringing philosophical theory and legal practice together 191
11.3 The list of human rights that emerges from the personhood account
11.4 Current legal lists: civil and political rights
11.5 Interlude on the aims and status of international law
11.6 Current legal lists: economic, social, and cultural rights
11.7 The future of international lists of human rights
12. A Right to Life, a Right to Death
12.1 The scope of the right to life
12.2 Locke on the scope of the right
12.3 Personhood as the ground of the right
12.4 From a right to life to a right to death
12.5 Is there a right to death?
12.6 Is it a positive or a negative right?
13. Privacy
13.1 Personhood and the content of a human right to privacy
13.2 Legal