Common Sense A Contemporary Defense( Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)
- New York Cambridge University 2010
- 192p
includes index and biblioraphy
1 The Common Sense Tradition 1 1.1 Some Main Features of the Common Sense Tradition 2 1.2 Evidence or Irresistibility? 13 2 Common Sense and Reliability I 24 2.1 Two Assumptions 24 2.2 The Problem of Circularity: Alston and Sosa 36 3 Common Sense and Reliability II 48 3.1 Fumerton`s Objections 48 3.2 Vogel, Roxanne, and the Neo-Moorean Argument 53 3.3 Further Reflections and Reflective Knowers 60 4 Reid, Reliability, and Reid`s Wrong Turn 67 4.1 Reid on Our Knowledge of the Reliability of Our Faculties 67 4.2 Reid`s Wrong Turn 76 5 Moore, Skepticism, and the External World 85 5.1 Moore`s Proof and the Charge of Question-Begging 85 5.2 Moore`s Response to Skepticism and Stroud`s Objection 91 5.3 The Sensitivity Requirement and the Contextualist Criticism 96 6 Chisholm, Particularism, and Methodism 105 6.1 Chisholm and the Problem of the Criterion 106 6.2 What`s Wrong with Methodism? Ill 6.3 Supervenience and Particular Epistemic Beliefs 116 6.4 Moser`s Criticism of Particularism 122 6.5 Bonjour`s Criticism of Particularism 128 6.6 Butchvarov`s Objection 132 7 Common Sense and A Priori Epistemology 135 7.1 Chisholm on Epistemic Principles and A Priori Knowledge 136 7.2 Modest A Priori Knowledge 144 7.3 Lycan`s Defense of the Moorean Response to Skepticism 150 7.4 Modest A Priori Knowledge and Common Sense Particularism 152 8 Particularism, Ethical Skepticism, and Moral Philosophy 157 8.1 Some Criticisms of Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Particularism 162 8.2 Justified Belief About Particular Actions Reconsidered 170