The Philosophy of Gottlob Frege
- New York Cambridge University 2011
- 226p
includes index and biblioraphy
1 Biography 2 Function and Argument 2.1 Introduction 2.2 What Is a Function? 2.3 Function and Argument 2.4 Extensions of the Notation 2.5 The Substitution Principle for Reference 2.6 Formal Mode and Material Mode 3 Sense and Reference 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Paradox of Identity 3.3 The Sharpened Paradox 3.4 The Generalized Paradox 3.5 Three Solutions 3.6 Sense and Reference 4 Frege`s Begriffsschrift Theory of Identity 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Begriffsschrift Semantic Theory 4.3 Criticism: The Received View 4.4 Criticism: Church-Langford Considerauons 4.5 Criticism: The Alleged Regress 4.6 Criticism: Use/Mention Confusion 5 Concept and Object 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Objects 5.3 The Combining Tie 5.4 Logical Grammar 5.5 Metaphors 5.6 The Puzzle of the Concept Horse 5.7 An Analysis of the Puzzle 5.8 A Solution to the Puzzle 5.9 Morals 6 Names and Descriptions 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Russell`s Theory of Descriptions 6.3 The Scope Distinction 6.4 Russell`s Three Puzzles 6.5 Frege and Russell on Definite Descriptions Existence 7.1 Introduction 7.2 The Frege/Russell View About `Existence` 7.3 Is `Exists` a Predicate? 7.4 Russell`s Machinery 7.5 Frege`s Mistake 7.6 Nonreferring Singular Terms 7.7 Kant on Being 8 Thought, Truth Value, and Assertion 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The Frege Argument 8.3 A Sharpening of Frege`s Argument 8.4 A Problematic Use of Frege`s Argument 8.5 A Way out of Frege`s Argument 8.6 Truth and Assertion 8.7 Is `True` a Predicate? 8.8 The Correspondence Theory of Truth 9 Indirect Reference 9.1 Introduction 9.2 The Sense/Reference Story 9.3 Some Loose Ends 9.4 The Infinite Hierarchy 9.5 Collapsing the Hierarchy 9.6 Russell`s Other Shoe 9.7 Reflections on the Argument 10 Through the Quotation Marks 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Quine: Structureless Names 10.3 Davidson: Demonstrative Names 10.4 Parsons: Fregean Names 10.5 A Formalism 10.6 Philosophical Remarks