000			03089cam a2200385 i 4500
999			_c108954 _d108954
001			22061119
003			OSt
005			20211129120713.0
008			210601t20212021enk b 001 0 eng d
010			_a 2021940267
015			_aGBC197735 _2bnb
016	7		_a020234556 _2Uk
020			_a0192898485 _q(hardback)
020			_a9780192898487 _q(hardback)
035			_a(OCoLC)on1231958376
040			_aYDX _beng _cYDX _erda _dBDX _dUKMGB _dOCLCO _dYDXIT _dOCLCF _dPTS _dCDX _dDLC
042			_alccopycat
050	0	0	_aBD201 _b.B47 2021
082	0	4	_aN18 _223 _bB454
100	1		_aBergmann, Michael, _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aRadical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition / _cMichael Bergmann.
250			_aFirst Edition.
264		1	_aOxford, United Kingdom : _bOxford University Press, _c2021.
300			_ax, 282 pages ; _c24 cm
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 267-277) and index.
520			_a"Radical skepticism endorses the extreme claim that large swaths of our ordinary beliefs, such as those produced by perception or memory, are irrational. The best arguments for such skepticism are, in their essentials, as familiar as a popular science fiction movie and yet even seasoned epistemologists continue to find them strangely seductive. Moreover, although most contemporary philosophers dismiss radical skepticism, they cannot agree on how best to respond to the challenge it presents. In the tradition of the 18th century Scottish philosopher, Thomas Reid, Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition joins this discussion by taking up four main tasks. First, it identifies the strongest arguments for radical skepticism, namely, underdetermination arguments, which emphasize the gap between our evidence and our ordinary beliefs based on that evidence. Second, it rejects all inferential or argument-based responses to radical skepticism, which aim to lay out good noncircular reasoning from the evidence on which we base our ordinary beliefs to the conclusion that those beliefs are probably true. Third, it develops a commonsense noninferential response to radical skepticism with two distinctive features: (a) it consciously and extensively relies on epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about epistemic goods, such as knowledge and rationality, and (b) it can be endorsed without difficulty by both internalists and externalists in epistemology. Fourth, and finally, it defends this commonsense epistemic-intuition-based response to radical skepticism against a variety of objections, including those connected with underdetermination worries, epistemic circularity, disagreement problems, experimental philosophy, and concerns about whether it engages skepticism in a sufficiently serious way"-- _cProvided by publisher.
650		0	_aSkepticism.
650		0	_aKnowledge, Theory of.
906			_a7 _bcbc _ccopycat _d2 _encip _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2ddc _cBK