000			03330nam a2200229 a 4500
001			nice12345678
003			Monogr.mrc
005			20200111182515.0
008			16-May-17s1983 Lona grp 000 0 eng
020			_a9024728185 _c0
082	0	0	_aN75.1KI _bR275
100			_aReiner, Hans
245			_aDuty and Inclination _b The Fundamentals of Morality Discussed and Redefined With Special Regard to Kant and Schiller
260			_aLondon _bMartinus Nijhoff _c1983
300			_a306p
500			_aincludes index and biblioraphy
505	2		_a. KANT`S SYSTEMS OF ETHICS IN ITS RELA TION TO SCHILLER`S ETHICAL VIEWS Some Main Features of Kant`s Ethics 15 The Part Feeling Plays in Morality 23 Schiller`s Views on Kant`s Ethics 29 Kant`s Answer to Schiller 35 Were Kant and Schiller Really of One Mind? 41 The Question Whether Kant or Schiller was Right 49 CHAPTER 2: A CRITIQUE OF THE GROUNDWORK OF KANT`S ETHICS A Preliminary Discussion of the Relevance of Questions about Method to a Critique of a Philosophical System 51 The Method of Kant`s Ethics and the Extreme Limit He Sets on Our Ethics Insight 54 A Critique of the Method of Kant`s Ethics 62 Some Main Points of a Critique of Kant`s System of Ethics The Moral Good as the Good in Itself 71 Some Main Points of a Critique of Kant`s System of Ethics 2. The Moral Law and Its Formula 75 Some Main Points of a Critique of Kant`s System of Ethics 3. Morality and Freedom 81 B SYSTEMATIC PART CHAPTER 3: THE METHOD REQUIRED IN ETHICS The Part that Experience and Induction Play in the Method of Ethics 88 The Method and Task of Ethics 92 Ethics` Method Applied 99 CHAPTER 4: THE ORIGINS OF THE MORAL OUGHT AND ITS RELATIONS TO INCLINATION AND WILLING The Phenomena of Consciousness of the Moral Ought 112 The Place of Conscience in the Human Personality and in Human Freedom 121 The Nature and Concept of Willing. Willing as a Judgement by the Will and the Ought-to-Be 125 Judgements by the Will, Striving and Inclination. The Objectivity of the Ought-to-Be and the Concept of Value 131 ¿ 21 Critical Excursus: The Relations of Heidegger and Thomism to the Concept and Datum of Value 146 The Origin of the Ought-to-Do (Ought-to-Conduct-Oneself- so) from the Objective Ought-to-Be. A Sense of Responsibili¿ty and a Sense of Honor as the Corresponding Subjective Sources 167 The Moral Ought in Its Primary, Axionomic (Not Fully Autonomous) Form 173 The Secondary Non-Autonomous Moral Ought, Which Is Grounded on a Relation to an Authority 184 On the Question Whether There are Non-Strict Moral Demands and a Sphere of the Morally Permissible 191 Corroborations of the Objectivity of Conscience. The Autonomization of the Axionomic Moral Ought 199 Structures and Effects Intrinsic to the Autonomous Moral Ought 211 The Relation of a Sense of Honor to an Autonomized Consciousness of the Ought 219 Duty and Inclination: Moral Obligation and Volition 222 VII The Natures of the Moral Good and Evil, Especially in Their Relation to the Moral Ought 230 The Morality of Conduct (Sittlichkeit des Verhaltens) and the Morality of Being (Sittlichkeit des Seins) 244 The First Fundamentals of Morality 246
700	1		_aReiner, Hans
902			_bSLR
942			_cBK
999			_c3205 _d3205